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Au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, l’impression courante parmi le public
selon laquelle les marchands tiraient avantage du conflit pour soutirer des profits
excessifs devint un enjeu de premier plan dans la vie politique à Terre-Neuve et la
cause d’un mécontentement public répandu. Le Fishermen’s Protective Union et
d’autres organisations syndicales surent utiliser la question du mercantilisme
comme un catalyseur de mobilisation politique et réussirent en 1917 à forcer l’État
à accroître son rôle en matière de régulation de l’économie. Bien que leurs gains se
soient avérés de courte durée, l’épisode marqua un moment déterminant dans
l’histoire de l’action collective des classes ouvrières de Terre-Neuve.
During the First World War a widespread public impression that merchants were
taking advantage of the conflict to extract excessive profits became a major issue in
Newfoundland politics, and a cause of widespread public discontent. The Fishermen’s
Protective Union and other labour organizations were able to use the profiteering
issue as a catalyst for political mobilization, and by 1917 had succeeded in forcing
the state to take a greater role in regulating the economy. While their gains turned out
to be short-lived, the episode marked a significant moment in the history of collective
action by Newfoundland’s labouring classes.
IN THE EARLY SUMMER OF 1917, as thousands of Newfoundland soldiers and
seamen were fighting in what had been billed as “the greatest war in the history of
the World,”1 a conflict of another kind was being played out at home. This struggle
pitted the labouring classes of fishermen and wage workers – often called the
“producing classes” in the parlance of the time – against both local capitalists and the
government of Newfoundland Prime Minister Sir Edward Patrick Morris. The
Evening Advocate, official organ of the Fishermen’s Protective Union (FPU),
claimed that while young Newfoundlanders were sacrificing their lives in a war
against Prussian militarism the Newfoundland government had adopted the “Prussian
Creed of Might is Right” with respect to its treatment of the labouring classes. The
same paper labelled Morris the “local Von Bissing,” a reference to the military
governor of German-occupied Belgium.2 The recently formed Newfoundland
Industrial Workers Association, meanwhile, accused the ruling classes of betraying
the very principles of democracy and “fair play” for which the Allied powers were
1 Evening Telegram, 22 August 1914.
2 Evening Advocate: 1 June 1917, 15 June 1917.
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ostensibly fighting.3 The battle lines between the labouring and the ruling classes
appeared clearly drawn. By the end of that summer, however, the character of
Newfoundland politics had undergone a radical change. Through collective
organization the workers and fishermen had succeeded in exerting a major influence
over the government, and FPU President William F. Coaker had become the
dominant force in a new coalition ministry. It represented one of the most significant
victories in the history of labouring-class struggle in Newfoundland, albeit a
temporary one.
The key wartime issue that brought together the two main segments of
Newfoundland’s labouring population was that of capitalist profiteering. Organizations
representing both workers and fishermen accused local merchants of taking advantage
of wartime conditions to extract excessive profits, and made opposition to this
profiteering a basis for political mobilization. Increased labour militancy during the
war was not a phenomenon exclusive to Newfoundland. Accusations of profiteering
were widespread during the First World War, becoming a staple argument of working-
class organizations and left-wing politicians in both Britain and France from the
earliest weeks of the war.4 In Canada, Newfoundland’s closest neighbour and fellow
British dominion, wartime price inflation led to complaints by workers and farmers in
many parts of the country, and by 1917 was a major factor in a growing wave of labour
unrest. As governments, both federal and provincial, demanded increasing sacrifices of
the population, the image of capitalist interests exploiting the war effort to further
enrich themselves provided a powerful impetus for collective action by the labouring
classes to better their own condition. Deploying the same language of “duty” and
“sacrifice” used by politicians and business leaders in support of the war, combined
with the ideas of the pre-war Progressive Movement, a rapidly growing organized
labour movement demanded that the state adopt new regulatory measures to protect the
rights of workers as well as more progressive taxation to ensure that the wealthy paid
their share. But unlike in Newfoundland, where the government took a much more
accommodating position toward labour as the war drew to a close, in Canada the last
few months of the war witnessed a shift of government policy toward increasing
repression of labour organizations.5
Wartime discussion in Newfoundland of profiteering took place within the context
of a longstanding popular resentment of the St. John’s-based merchant class, which
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controlled much of the country’s economy and influenced politics through its
domination of the Legislative Council (the appointed upper house of the legislature).
During the war, the widespread impression that merchants – notably the largest and
wealthiest – were taking advantage of the war to extract excess profits from trade
provided workers and fishermen with a focus for class discontent, while the war gave
their struggle both a powerful mode of rhetoric and a source of legitimation. The
language of anti-German propaganda and the characterization of the war as a moral
struggle between right and wrong as well as a political struggle between democracy
and autocracy was deployed with particular effect by representatives of the producing
classes in their confrontation with Newfoundland’s ruling elite. Though the gains
made by producers were partial, and would be eroded considerably in the years after
the war, they nevertheless provide an example of the potential of collective action
within a wartime context.
War, class, and politics in 1914
With the onset of war in August 1914, Newfoundland quickly found itself in the
throes of a “commercial depression” that threatened to exacerbate the country’s
already considerable economic woes.6 The fishery, which employed over a quarter of
the population, had been “miserably poor” that year, particularly in the north, and the
disruption of trade that followed Britain’s declaration of war made matters much
worse. The resultant collapse of exchange rates, for instance, caused a rapid drop in
the price of fish.7 The war dealt a particularly hard blow to the lobster industry since
almost all of its output had previously been sold to Germany.8 In response to this
situation, local merchants agreed to pay fishermen $15 per 48-pound case for lobsters,
which they planned to store in Liverpool until the war was over. This was a steep drop
from the pre-war price of $23 per case, so the fishermen ended up bearing the brunt
of the crisis. Morris tried to persuade the War Office to purchase “at a reasonable
price” the existing unsold stock of 14,000 cases as food for British forces, but had
little success.9 Germany was also an important market for the Bell Island iron ore
mines, and the outbreak of war saw a temporary downturn in that industry as well
since mining companies cut their work forces in the early weeks of the conflict.10
In a letter to Governor Walter Davidson on 24 April 1915, Morris summed up the
hardships Newfoundland was facing: “What with our lobsters on hand since last
season unsold and practically no supplying being done for the lobster season this year,
the shutting down of the mines on Bell Island, the absolute failure of the seal fishery,
and the consequent loss of importations, it would take but little more to paralyze our
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trade.”11 Moreover, the war effort did not produce any immediate increase in
employment to compensate for these hardships. In the spring of 1915, hundreds of
men still migrated to Canada looking for a summer’s work. More than 400 alone left
to work for the Dominion Company in Cape Breton, most of them displaced miners
from Bell Island.12 Unemployment levels in St. John’s even increased slightly, as local
manufacturers were forced to lay off some workers due to the disruption of trade.13
While there was overwhelming popular support for the war effort, particularly in the
capital city where herculean efforts were put into the recruiting and mobilization of
the Newfoundland Regiment, the negative economic effects of the early months of the
war did not bode well for social or political solidarity.14
In the years leading up to the war, Newfoundland politics, fractious at the best of
times, had become increasingly polarized. Prime Minister Edward Morris, a cooper’s
son from a working-class neighbourhood in St. John’s, had become first a successful
lawyer and later an even more successful politician. His People’s Party frequently
deployed the language of populism, identifying with the “common people” of the
country and arguing that there was a commonality of interest between the producing
classes of fishermen and workers and an emerging industrial and professional middle
class. Morris and his allies believed that the promotion of local business and industry
was the best way to ensure the betterment of the labouring population, and their
platform in the 1913 election had included subsidies to local manufacturing interests
and the construction of railway branch lines to stimulate rural development. Through
its promises to create employment, the People’s Party had gained the support of a
significant portion of the labouring classes, particularly among the skilled workers in
the west end of St. John’s and among Morris’s fellow Roman Catholics.15 As for
industrial relations, Morris believed that capital and labour should be partners, sharing
in the “profits” of industry; while he thought that labourers should receive a “living
wage,” he was adamantly opposed to the use of strikes to obtain it.16
The Fishermen’s Protective Union, though initially optimistic when Morris had
taken office in 1908, had become outspokenly critical of the prime minister by 1913,
after his failure to enact any substantial reforms to the fishery. William F. Coaker,
president of the FPU and by far the dominant force within the organization that he had
founded at Herring Neck in 1908, saw fishery reform as the single most important
issue in Newfoundland, and his organization had a considerable following among
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Newfoundland’s fishermen (particularly along the northeast coast). The membership
was diverse, and not only was there considerable social differentiation among
fishermen themselves but the FPU was also open to farmers, loggers, and other
manual labourers. Coaker and the FPU advocated what they called the “New Gospel
of Unionism,” which was based on the premise that the producing classes alone
created the wealth of the country and that the proceeds of their labour should be
shared in a more equitable fashion. Coaker’s organization promoted collective action
to effect social change, albeit with an individualistic appeal summed up in the union’s
slogan: suum cuique (“to each his own”).17 In 1910 the FPU founded its own
newspaper, the Fishermen’s Advocate, to spread the “New Gospel” and to “break
down the old barriers that stood between the classes and the masses.” By 1913, the
Advocate’s circulation of some 11,000 exceeded that of any other local newspaper and
made it a vehicle for producing-class political agitation.18
In order to turn the “New Gospel” into a concrete plan of action, the FPU put
forward a lengthy list of fishery reforms that, in turn, became the centrepiece of its
political program when it formed its own Union Party in 1912.19 While this party was
originally conceived as an independent entity, it entered into an alliance with the
opposition Liberal Party and, in the 1913 election, Unionists claimed eight seats in the
legislature (mainly on the northeast coast).20 While the FPU members had initially
been junior partners in their alliance with the Liberals, they soon came to dominate
the opposition, particularly after Dr. William F. Lloyd, who was legal counsel for the
FPU, became Liberal leader in 1916.21
The FPU had powerful enemies. Most merchants, not surprisingly, were bitterly
opposed to any organization that threatened their economic domination of the country.
The Catholic Church was also adamantly opposed to the FPU, and for a time held that
membership in the organization was sinful.22 Not coincidentally, the southeast corner
of the island, where the Catholic Church was strongest, was also the area where the
FPU was weakest.23 Both merchants and clerics dismissed Coaker as a “socialist”
agitator, an allegation that Coaker indignantly denied. In his first speech to the House
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of Assembly, he said that the FPU was “as far from Socialism as the North Pole is
from the South.”24 Rather than advocating socialism, the FPU was dedicated to the
principle of “co-operative distribution” – that is, the distribution of resources so as to
benefit the people in general rather than just a small ruling clique.25 One Union Party
MHA, George Grimes, called himself a “socialist,” but this was only in terms of “the
elevation of the masses from the low position in which they are today.”26 While the
FPU could be vehemently radical in its rhetoric, its political aims were strictly
reformist in nature.
The primary targets of the FPU’s wrath were the leading merchant capitalists of St.
John’s, referred to collectively as “Water Street” after the city’s commercial district,
who through their control of the fishery almost completely dominated the
Newfoundland economy. The Advocate referred to these merchants as the “Ancient
Enemies of Newfoundland Progress.”27 Local poet James Murphy, describing the
“social grade” in Newfoundland that so strongly favoured the merchant class, noted: 
It sprung from folks who robbed your sires
Of the fruits of their hard toil,
Those snobbish-like “aristocrats,”
The kings of fish and oil.28
The long-established St. John’s merchant families who constituted the local
“fishocracy” were not the FPU’s only targets. Perhaps even more intensely vilified
were the owners of the Reid Newfoundland Company, “the great octopus” that owned
and operated the trans-insular railway as well as the Bishop’s Falls pulp and paper
mill, a fish exporting company, sawmills, and manufacturing plants.29 The Reids’
capital assets in Newfoundland, on paper at least, totalled roughly $15 million. While
they insisted that they were not making a profit on the railway, many
Newfoundlanders were unconvinced – especially given the huge salaries paid to the
Reids themselves, which the company listed as “expenses.” This apparent perfidy, as
well as their constant political intrigues, made the Reids “intensely unpopular” with
the Newfoundland people.30 The FPU also constantly linked the Morris government
with the Reids, who were known to have provided considerable financial backing for
the People’s Party. The result, said the Advocate, was a “reign of Grasp, Grab,
Boodleism and Financial Destruction” in which the government was presiding over
the “looting” of Newfoundland’s wealth,31 and the onset of a war ostensibly fought for
democracy only served to intensify this antipathy.
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As did many labour organizations in Canada, in 1914 the FPU came out strongly
in support of a war to defend the world against Prussian militarism, and especially to
save “brave Belgium.” Coaker believed that Britain was fighting “to fully establish 
. . . broad principles of democracy.”32 Yet the Advocate also argued that patriotism
should begin at home, saying that it was just as important to defend the weak in
Newfoundland as it was in Europe. Thus, to support the purpose of the war did not
necessarily mean supporting the Morris government.33 The FPU was not alone in its
refusal to set aside opposition to capital for the sake of the war. While some
employers seized upon the war as an excuse to demand suspension of all industrial
disputes, labour organizations generally maintained that the interests of workers still
had to be upheld. The relatively small industrial working class in Newfoundland had
become increasingly restive in the years leading up to the Great War. No fewer than
215 strikes took place between 1890 and 1914, with more than 70 per cent of these
involving “unskilled” or “semi-skilled” workers. Most of this labour unrest occurred
in St. John’s, where most of the wage-based labour was located.34 While actively
supporting the war effort (including the recruitment for the Newfoundland Regiment),
labour leaders remained disinclined to acquiesce to employers’ demands for even
more sacrifice on the part of the workers.35
Indeed, when the war began, the largest and most militant union in St. John’s – the
Longshoremen’s Protective Union (LSPU) – was on strike. With more than 2,600
members, both dockworkers and municipal sanitation employees, the LSPU had been
at the forefront of industrial unrest in the city.36 The outbreak of war brought calls for
union members to return to work. Former Finance Minister E.M. Jackman, for
instance, demanded that the LSPU give up its action since, in wartime, “there is no
issue between Liberal or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Labour or Capital – All are for
the State.” In response, “Big Jim” McGrath, president of the LSPU, dismissed
Jackman’s suggestion as ridiculous. For McGrath, there was “no more patriotic body
in Newfoundland” than the LSPU, but demands for wartime economy and thrift were
only convincing if observed by all – including the “wealthy employer.”37
As labour leaders embraced the British war effort, the rank and file of the working
population provided most of Newfoundland’s military forces. While many of the
earliest volunteers came from the middle classes of St. John’s, the overwhelming
majority of wartime recruits for the Newfoundland Regiment were drawn from the
producing classes of the city and, even though the realities of household production
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tended to restrict enlistment, the outports as well. In addition, virtually all of the men
who served in the Royal Naval Reserve came from the fishing population of the
outports.38 Participation in the war effort, though, was not restricted to men, as large
numbers of women from the producing classes were active in the Women’s Patriotic
Association by, for example, knitting woollen socks and scarves for soldiers overseas.39
War and economic opportunity
The sacrifices required of the population under wartime conditions would, on their
own, likely have exacerbated class tensions in Newfoundland, even as increasing
demand gradually created an expansion of trade and employment. Early in the war,
however, Newfoundland capitalists embarked on two courses of action that intensified
class antagonism and gave producing-class opposition powerful issues around which
to coalesce on the basis that the motive in each case was to extract increased profits.
The first of these actions was the sale by merchants, at inflated prices, of almost every
steel-hulled steam vessel in Newfoundland, a transaction that would prove to be rather
short-sighted. The second was the successful lobbying of the government to allow the
export from Newfoundland to Britain, again at what appeared to be high rates of
profit, of raw timber that many rural inhabitants felt to be the common property of all
Newfoundlanders.
The Russian government, when the war began, found itself critically short of
icebreaking steamships, which it needed to keep open ports in the White Sea.
Newfoundland merchants, meanwhile, owned what was arguably the world’s finest
fleet of such ships. The Tsarist authorities soon approached Newfoundland
shipowners to offer payment of more than market value if these vessels were for
sale.40 The shipowners were eager to respond. The first ships sold were Reid
Newfoundland Company’s freight and passenger steamers Lintrose and Bruce, both
of which had been employed on the run between North Sydney and Port aux
Basques.41 By the spring of 1916, five other vessels had been sold to the Russian
Admiralty “at a handsome profit”: A.J. Harvey’s icebreakers Bellaventure,
Bonaventure, and Adventure; Job Brothers’ Beothic; and Baine Johnson’s Iceland
(which was still under construction on the Clyde).42 The sales represented a windfall
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for the firms involved since, according to Governor Davidson, the vessels were sold
“at prices which were practically double their original cost.”43 The owners were aided
and abetted in this enterprise by the Newfoundland government, which hastened to
give approval. Opposition politicians quickly alleged that the transactions had been
“railroaded” through the Executive Council by friends of the merchants involved, but
these charges were denied by Colonial Secretary J.R. Bennett. Russian agents
involved in the negotiations, meanwhile, demanded that all details of the transactions
be strictly censored, deepening suspicions of collusion.44
While profitable for the shipowners, the sale of the steamers would prove costly for
the country as a whole. The vessels that the Reids used to replace Lintrose and Bruce
on the Cabot Strait run were too small for the task. The 835-ton Meigle, for instance,
was a poor substitute for the 1,700-ton Bruce. The result was a severe congestion of
Newfoundland-bound freight in Sydney by late 1915.45 The coastal boat service in
Notre Dame Bay and Placentia Bay was also badly congested due to lack of adequate
steamers. To make matters worse, the Allan and Black Diamond Lines, which ran
steamer services between Montreal and St. John’s, suspended operations in 1915 on the
grounds that wartime conditions made the service unprofitable.46
As the tonnage crisis became increasingly serious, the sale of the steamers became
a contentious political issue. In particular, the “patriotic” motives of the shipowners
were called into question.47 In the House of Assembly, government backbencher J.M.
Currie said that the shipowners were using the war as an excuse to “get rich quick” –
noting that while they spoke loudly of their patriotism they “took good care it was the
kind of patriotism that paid.” Liberal leader James Kent called the owners’ action
unpatriotic, and insisted that they be held responsible for replacing the lost tonnage
out of the “excessive profits” that they made on the sales.48 Lloyd proposed a tax on
the profits from the transactions, but his motion was defeated by the government.49
The local Board of Trade rose to the defence of the shipowners, saying that they could
not have foreseen the consequences of their actions, and that “the tempting offers
made to them could not be resisted and there was also a desire to help our Ally.”50 By
mid-1916 the government had realized its mistake, and refused to allow Bowring
Brothers to sell the coastal steamers Prospero and Portia to the French government;
but an extreme shortage of tonnage would continue to threaten Newfoundland’s
ability to import goods and to export fish and other products to overseas markets for
the remainder of the war.51
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While the onset of war found Russia short of icebreakers, it also created a problem
for the British coal-mining industry. Its supply of pit timber from Russia and
Scandinavia was now threatened by the presence of the German High Seas Fleet in
the Baltic Sea. Shortly after the declaration of war, the Board of Trade in London, on
the recommendation of St. John’s merchant R.B. Job, despatched a group of buyers to
investigate the timber situation in Newfoundland and eastern Canada. After
consultation with the Morris government, this delegation reported to London that
Newfoundland possessed “an almost inexhaustible quantity of timber” that could be
“had on the spot for nothing.” It also reported that labour for cutting pit props could
be easily found in Newfoundland during the winter months, when there was “no
apparent fixity or continuity of employment” on the island; most fishermen had
experience in cutting wood, and would require no instruction and little supervision.52
Although pit prop exports thus seemed to have all the makings of a profitable
venture, there were obstacles. First, Newfoundland, in order to stimulate local
industry, had prohibited the export of unmanufactured timber from either the island or
Labrador. Second, cutting rights were restricted on all land within three miles of the
shore. In this area, known as the “Three-Mile Limit” or “Fishermen’s Reserve,” wood
could be cut freely by the local inhabitants for their own use in building boats and
houses or for fuel. As such, this timber was considered to be a “common property
resource,” and commercial cutting or export of timber from this area had been
prohibited since 1898. Before the war the FPU had led the fight to defend the Three-
Mile Limit from encroachments by commercial developers, and forest conservation
was also an important consideration. Despite the vast extent of Newfoundland’s
forested areas, much of this forest, particularly near the coast, had been burned over
so the wood was generally of a small size. Before the war, Coaker had warned the
House of Assembly of the dire consequences of the rapid depletion of timber, a
problem which he said was due largely to lack of government conservation
measures.53
With the outbreak of war, however, patriotic fervour took precedence over both
customary rights and forest conservation. Government politicians were enthusiastic
about this new export industry, which was heralded not only as a contribution to the
war effort but as a source of money and jobs. Finance Minister Michael Cashin noted
that Britain’s pre-war pit prop imports were worth triple the cash value of
Newfoundland’s cod fishery and insisted that investment by British capitalists was a
sure way to “develop great wealth.” These sentiments were echoed by other
government members, one of them identified by Coaker as solicitor for a company
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interested in exporting pit props.54 In September 1914, in a special war session of the
legislature, the Morris government removed the restriction on the export of
unmanufactured timber, allowing the export of pit props to the United Kingdom
(though the status of the Three-Mile Limit under this legislation was somewhat
nebulous).55 To prevent abuses of the export provisions the legislature also passed the
1915 Saw Mills Act, which restricted the right of property in cut timber to a period of
18 months from the date of cutting.56
The FPU and its Liberal allies were unconvinced that pit prop exports were in the
interest of Newfoundlanders, and suspected that the removal of cutting restrictions
was primarily a favour for capitalist friends of the government. Coaker’s position was
that the timber was the property of the people, and should be used only for the benefit
of the population as a whole rather than for individual gain.57 The Advocate called the
pit prop scheme “a plot to take the people’s heritage without their consent or leave [in
order] to make a number of land grabbers wealthy.” It called such speculators
“English sports” intent upon “killing the goose which lays the golden egg.” Citing as
well the importance of forest conservation, the Advocate warned FPU members
against becoming involved in such a destructive industry, especially at the wages
being offered. Fishermen who cut pit props, the paper said, might as well “cut off their
right hand with their left.” Linking the issue directly to the politics of the war, the
Advocate warned that by supporting this looting of Newfoundland’s wealth the
government was betraying “principles of such importance to the People that during
the past 34 months 1,000,000 Britishers have died or become totally disabled to
defend.” Union MHA William Halfyard stated that the patriotic claims made by
prospective exporters were merely a “guise [for] giving these people a license to clean
the country out.” Patriotism, he said, meant “that which will bring prosperity to our
future generations,” and should not be used as an excuse to exact profits.58
Moreover, even though a 1915 act had prohibited the export of green timber cut on
the Three-Mile Limit, by 1916 the Executive Council had begun issuing permits to cut
such timber.59 In the House of Assembly, Coaker remarked upon the irony of the
government passing a law to protect the Three-Mile Limit and then issuing permits for
companies to cut pit props on this land. “Everything we handle in Newfoundland,” he
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said, “we seem to make a bungle of and only awake to the fact when the horse is stolen.
Then we lock the door.” Lloyd warned that cutting timber on the Three-Mile Limit was
going to cause “much dissatisfaction” in rural areas, and could lead to serious trouble.60
Protests against the pit prop industry had already been reported from Bonavista Bay,
Notre Dame Bay, and other northern areas.61 One man in Jackson’s Cove reported that
in the Hall’s Bay area “every man was against Pit Props being cut. They said that . . .
every stick fit for beams, longers and even wood would be cut. They was not in favour
of having it stopped this winter, as they was in it, but they said it should never have
been started . . . . If the Companies that need it can’t pay money enough to go a mile
[inland] after it let them go where they can get it cheaper.”62 Another man in Baie Verte
said that while most fishermen thought that cutting pit props, especially on the Three-
Mile Limit, was wrong, they were willing to do it because they were “very badly off”
following the previous summer’s poor fishery.63 Union MHA Walter Jennings said that
the general attitude of people in the outports was that if the forest was “going to be
destroyed it is just as well for [them] to go there and earn a dollar as anybody else.”64
Another problem had also emerged. Once the pit props had been cut, merchants
reported difficulties in finding tonnage to transport them to Britain at rates that would
make the venture profitable.65 With shipping costs at an all-time high due to the
shortage of tonnage, Newfoundland’s exports of timber to the U.K. in 1917 dropped
to less than one-tenth of the quantity exported in 1916.66 Morris estimated that the
unexported stock of pit props was worth more than $500,000, though the deterioration
of the cut timber over time was causing a depreciation in this value. Local exporters
claimed that the wood would soon be unsuitable even for making pulp, and demanded
that the government allow them to export it to Canada or the United States.67 The
president of Horwood Lumber Company, along with other representatives of logging
interests, wrote to Agriculture and Mines Minister Sidney Blandford demanding that
the government do something about unshipped pit props at various locations around
the island. They were incensed that certain “irresponsible persons” had read the 1915
Saw Mills Act and come to the conclusion that property rights in the cut timber had
terminated. “In pursuance of this idea,” they said, thousands of pit props were being
appropriated by local people, and they demanded “drastic action” by the government
to protect their investment.68
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The matter came to a head in early June 1917, when rumours of a “temporary
revolution” in Twillingate began to reach St. John’s. According to press reports, a
large crowd had threatened to tear down the local courthouse after two fishermen were
arrested for taking pit props. In the process, a British ensign was said to have been
pulled down and ripped apart.69 The timber exporters accused Lloyd and Jennings of
instigating the disturbance, and the two were forced on 7 June to defend themselves
in an emergency debate in the House of Assembly. Lloyd told the house that a number
of men in Twillingate who had appropriated pit props that had been cut on the Three-
Mile Limit had approached him to find out about their rights in the matter. These men,
he said, felt that “their birthright, as they regard the 3-mile limit, had been violated.”
Jennings, who represented the district of Twillingate, said that the pit props had been
cut in contravention of the ban on the cutting of green timber on the Three-Mile Limit
for export purposes, and that the government had given its tacit approval to this illegal
action. He said he knew nothing about any flag-burning. According to Coaker, the pit
props in question had been picked up on the beach after a boom broke apart in a storm.
He added that the people of the area believed the timber to have been illegally cut, and
that they “were so aroused that one hundred men made up their minds that no one else
should be fined” for appropriating timber that they felt was rightfully theirs.70
Noting the widespread resentment of the government’s handling of the pit prop
situation, the Advocate warned that “a match if lighted would embroil the whole North
and entail consequences which might have a terrible ending.” The government also
realized that what was essentially a minor incident could easily turn into something
more dangerous. Government MHA A.W. Piccott admitted, for instance, that to send
constables to Twillingate would be “like showing a red rag to a bull,” and urged his
fellow ministers to proceed with caution. The next morning, constables who had been
despatched to Twillingate were hastily recalled to St. John’s. Coaker, for his part, sent
a message to the FPU Council in Twillingate, urging fishermen to refrain from rioting.
Meanwhile, a letter from a correspondent in Twillingate said that, while there had
been a public demonstration against pit prop cutting, the flag incident was the
invention of pit prop owners who wanted government intervention to prevent further
appropriation of cut timber.71
In August 1917, a series of government measures conceded the failure of the pit
prop scheme. All pit props cut before 1 November 1915 were exempted from the 18-
month restriction on property rights. To protect the rights of cutters, the house passed
legislation granting them a lien on pit props for any unpaid wages. The same legislation
also allowed any pit props cut prior to January 1917 to be exported to Canada or the
U.S. By late summer the cutting of pit props, having proved unprofitable, was
abandoned, and many of the existing pit props were being used for palings or sent to
local saw mills for construction lumber.72 The pit prop controversy demonstrated once
again the cleavage between those who produced and those who profited.
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In general, with its very small industrial base and with persistent transportation
problems, Newfoundland was unable to replicate the exponential growth of munitions
and shipbuilding industries that occurred in wartime Canada. In 1916, some local
investors established a small factory in St. John’s to produce artillery shells for the
British Army. While the Newfoundland Shell Company was initially successful, the
growing shortage of shipping tonnage led to delays in obtaining raw materials and in
shipping its finished products to England and the factory closed down before the war
was over.73 Thus, while the war effort gradually increased demand for fish and a few
other local products, Newfoundland’s business community was unable to take much
advantage of the growing demand for the materials of war. Yet the vigour of its efforts
to do so, and to maximize profits accordingly, had been unmistakable.
The politics of prices
As it became apparent that local merchants were intent upon using the war as a means
of increasing their profit margin, the FPU and various working-class organizations
seized upon profiteering as a potent issue upon which to focus class discontent. The
use of what many saw as a cynical appeal to patriotism by a business community who
wanted only to line their own pockets gave added credibility to criticism of the
existing economic order. This was clear in the case of the sale of the icebreaking fleet,
in which shipowners had profited at the expense of the public interest, as it was in the
case of the export of timber, which many believed was a looting the country’s
heritage. It was, however, the rapid escalation of retail prices for imported goods that
provided the opposition with its most immediate and effective ammunition.
Two weeks after the war began, the Advocate warned that patriotism might be used
by local merchants as an excuse for “bleeding the purchaser of additional profits.”
Liberal James Kent said that extorting “unfair profits” was nothing short of treason.
Even the pro-government Daily News issued a harsh condemnation of any businessmen
who might try to “wrench a wretched profit out of suffering and tears,” and demanded
immediate government action to forestall profiteering. While the paper claimed it was
not generally in favour of “paternalism” on the part of government, it felt that such
action was justified under the circumstances.74 In early September 1914, in response to
these public demands, the House of Assembly passed an anti-profiteering measure, the
Food Stuffs Act, which gave the Governor in Council the power to seize any food
supplies that he believed were being “unreasonably withheld from market” and, if
necessary, to fix maximum food prices.75 Despite the passage of this act, the Morris
government would prove reluctant to take any concrete action against profiteering.
In early December 1915, rumours of an impending coal shortage began to circulate
in St. John’s. Morris quickly contacted local dealers, who informed him that their
stocks were “abnormally low” because of the scarcity of tonnage.76 Shortages of flour,
oats, cattle feed, and other imports were also reported.77 Prices of these goods soared,
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resulting in charges from opposition politicians and the general public that merchants
were using the shortages as an excuse to increase their profit margin. Because those
who benefited from high retail prices were from the same class as those who had sold
the local steel-hulled fleet – some of them the very same people – many among the
working classes thought it was unjust that these people should profit from their own
short-sighted action.78 Nor was the problem of high prices restricted to St. John’s.
Indeed, the problem of obtaining coal in the outports at a reasonable rate had been a
problem even before the war.79 The 1916 coal shortage was more severe in St. John’s
than in some of the outports, however, because outport schooners that carried fish out
of Newfoundland during the fall were able to return with cargoes of coal. Some rural
communities, though, particularly in Conception Bay, reported severe shortages of
fuel.80 If the situation on the island in the winter of 1916 was bad, conditions in
Labrador were even worse. Dr. H.L. Paddon reported from North West River that
“serious food shortages” were causing “awful distress,” and claimed that the
government and the St. John’s merchants were doing nothing to ease the problem.81
By early January 1916, the Morris government knew that something would have to
be done about coal prices. The Evening Telegram reported that the working classes of
St. John’s, who held the greed of the merchants entirely to blame for the coal situation,
were “very near a revolt.”82 While Morris was fairly certain that the “well-to-do” could
obtain coal, those who could afford to buy only in small quantities had to face
exorbitant prices or do without.83 Faced with growing public hostility, Morris was
finally ready to admit publicly that local dealers were withholding coal and that, while
he held that coal dealers were justified in making a “reasonable profit,” the rapid
escalation in coal prices was not “warranted by the facts.” As such, he felt he had no
choice but to invoke the Food Stuffs Act.84 On 10 January the government fixed the
price of all existing stocks of coal to prevent further increases.85 Despite expressions of
concern for the problems encountered by poor people, however, Morris was only
willing to go so far in alleviating the coal shortage. When it was suggested that the
government subsidize coal shipments, he refused – citing a fear of being “mulcted for
a large amount” by local merchants.86 In the end, no long-term measures were taken
and the shortages and high prices of January 1916 were repeated the following winter.
Coal prices were again fixed, and supplies were rationed, with sales of more than one
quarter ton at a time being punishable by a fine or imprisonment.87 This moderated, but
did not eliminate, the problem of supply, and public resentment remained.
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Predictably, Reid Newfoundland Company received the lion’s share of the blame
for soaring consumer prices. The Reids were unpopular in Newfoundland at the best
of times, and reports that they were pocketing huge profits due to freight increases
produced what the governor called “considerable discontent.”88 According to Coaker,
“Sir William Reid show[s] no inclination to consider any interest but that of enriching
himself and his family at the expense of the people of this country at a time when all
who love the Flag and Empire should be making sacrifices for one common
purpose.”89 The Advocate noted that high prices were hurting both fishermen and
labourers, and it asked the government why the Reid Newfoundland Company, which
had “captured so many millions of the people’s dollars . . . at the expense of their
public obligations,” should not be ordered to supply coal to the island. The FPU paper
further claimed that Morris bore much responsibility for the coal shortage, since he
had stood by while the fleet was sold off.90
Opposition attacks on the government for its inaction on the issue of rising prices
continued into 1917. The Advocate accused the Reids of imposing a “starvation
embargo” on the island, and said that the government’s handling of the situation was
one more addition to “the long list of Tory scandals.” It condemned “the daily
abstraction of the pound of flesh from the mechanics and labourers” by profiteers who
raised prices while keeping wages low, aided by “a useless bunch of political pawns
known as a Government [who] are either too wicked or too cowardly to investigate
the cost of living.”91 Another account described the coal business as “Barefaced
Robbery,” calling it “the greatest piece of rascality that has ever been perpetrated
upon the working classes and widows of St. John’s.”92 Joining in, one Evening
Telegram columnist claimed that the war had presented the Reids and other merchants
with an opportunity for “polite robbery,” helped along by a “weak and hesitating”
government that tacitly condoned their action. Collective action by the public, he said,
was the only solution.93
Central to the debate on profiteering was the question of what exactly constituted
“patriotism.” In the eyes of many if not most members of the producing classes,
capitalists who used the war as an opportunity to increase their profit margin were
anything but patriots. One trade union leader claimed that profiteering was
“unpatriotic,” particularly since the war was being waged for “peace and freedom,”
and insisted that profiteers be treated as “leppers and pariahs.”94 The Advocate
complained: “We are reminded daily that we are at war with a relentless foe, who has
staked his all on ‘world domination.’ Isn’t it reasonable to suppose that steps should
now be taken to protect the masses?”95 Nothing was more galling than the fact that the
people who were making profits because of the war were also the people most vocal
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in their support of the war effort. In early 1917, James Murphy lent his pen to the
condemnation of such “mouth patriots”:
We have “patriots” here in plenty,
Sure we have them in galore,
Oh, the list is very lengthy
And there’s none of them are poor.
But the way they make the money
Unto us seems very queer,
For they raise the price, ‘tis funny,
Now on what we eat and wear,
And they ask us to go fight the Huns,
While they sell us coal each hour,
At eleven dollars for a ton,
And twelve for a barrel of flour.96
Indeed, the merchants and their friends in government were increasingly compared
to the enemy overseas. For one writer in the Advocate, who used language reminiscent
of that used to describe the Germans in war propaganda, the “plunderers” who ran the
Newfoundland economy had created “conditions of cruelty and perfidy scarcely
parallelled in the most barbarous of ages.”97 Perhaps the most indignant comment on
profiteering came from an anonymous writer to the Advocate, who said that the action
of the coal merchants was worse than either the sinking of the Lusitania or the
reported atrocities in Belgium.98 Dr. Paddon, meanwhile, claimed that the
government’s treatment of the food shortage in Labrador was “worthy of
Prussianism.”99
Despite the ongoing problems with shipping and supply, and the political
controversy surrounding the profiteering issue, the war was gradually starting to
stimulate increased economic activity. In fact, the local Board of Trade referred to
1917 as one of the most prosperous years in Newfoundland’s history. Fish prices were
reportedly the highest on record, and unemployment had greatly diminished.100 What
was gained by the labouring classes in increased employment and higher export
prices, however, was largely offset by the accelerating cost of living. Prices of some
necessities had doubled or tripled since the beginning of the war, resulting in a
declining standard of living for many of the less wealthy inhabitants of
Newfoundland.101
The profiteering issue also provided the impetus for the creation of a new working-
class organization – the Newfoundland Industrial Workers Association (NIWA).
Formed in St. John’s on 25 April 1917 by metalworkers employed by the Reid
Producers versus Profiteers 61
96 James Murphy, “Patriotism and Prices,” Evening Advocate, 17 February 1917.
97 Evening Advocate, 22 May 1917. For an example of local anti-German propaganda, see Arthur
Selwyn-Brown, “Newfoundland and the War,” Newfoundland Quarterly 14, no. 4 (April 1915): 3.
98 Mail and Advocate, 6 January 1916.
99 Paddon to Sheard, 18 May 1916 (despatch 1916/53), GN 1/3/A, PANL.
100 Commercial Annual (1917), 83; McGrath and Lucas, “Newfoundland,” 395.
101 Proceedings of the Executive Council, 23 April 1917, GN 9/1, PANL.
00016-03 O'Brien Article_Layout  11-05-19  9:55 AM  Page 61
Newfoundland Company, the NIWA rapidly grew into a broad-based industrial union
as a number of existing trade unions affiliated themselves with the new organization.
Membership was open to those employed in all forms of manual and clerical labour,
and within a year the NIWA represented more than 3,500 workers. While there were
no formal ties between this new union and the FPU, Union Party MHA George
Grimes played a very active role in founding the NIWA. Like the FPU, the NIWA put
forward a program of economic and social reforms, including a minimum wage, an
eight-hour work day, and child labour laws.102
The NIWA quickly added its voice to the FPU’s campaign against profiteering. Its
leaders blamed “excessive profits” for the increased cost of living and, while insisting
that they did not seek to do away with “legitimate profits,” demanded that the
government strictly enforce the Food Stuffs Act to put an end to what the NIWA
called “legalized robbery.”103 The FPU saw the NIWA as a kindred spirit in the
struggle against the merchant class. The Advocate welcomed the creation of the
NIWA, saying it had always supported the idea of a movement which would bring “all
classes of Industrial Workers together” and asserted that the NIWA would do for the
workers of St. John’s “what the FPU has done for the outports.” It insisted that the
FPU and the NIWA shared a common cause, and that the new militancy of industrial
labour proved that “unrest really exists in the City, as it does in the Outports.”104
A “Ladies’ Branch” of the NIWA was also formed in 1917, with civil service clerk
Julia Salter Earle as its president.105 This group was not merely a women’s auxiliary; it
was a parallel organization to seek for women workers the same goals that the NIWA
was pursuing for men. As such, it was an autonomous group – able to pursue the
particular interests of wage-earning women. More than 400 women joined the Ladies’
Branch in its first five weeks of existence.106 This reflected the growing number of
women in the wartime wage labour force as well as the sacrifices made by women as a
result of the war effort. The Advocate noted that price increases were particularly hard
on women workers, most of whom made less than four dollars per month and who were,
in most cases, without paid overtime or sick leave for work that was often harder than
that done by men. If these women were forced to resort to stealing, the paper said, it was
“only to take what belongs to them, but is withheld by the merchant simply because he
loves filthy lucre above all things!” Scathingly, the Advocate declared that the treatment
of women workers was proof that “there are Germans other than from Germany.”107
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The FPU, the NIWA, and other labour organizations demanded that Newfoundland
establish a food control board, as had already been done in the United Kingdom and
in Canada. The Morris government finally acquiesced to opposition demands for
action in April 1917, appointing a High Cost of Living Commission (HCLC) to look
into the price question. The measure was initially greeted with derision by both the
FPU and the NIWA. The HCLC, headed by Morris loyalist P.T. McGrath and staffed
by friends of the government, was denounced by Coaker as an attempt “to throw dust
in the eyes of the people” since the government had no intention of actually doing
anything about a situation in which “Water Street to-day is richer than it ever was in
the history of this colony . . . with money that ought to be in the hands of poor
fishermen.”108 For all that, though, the HCLC would provide support for what many
critics of the merchants and the government had been saying about excessive prices.
Its first report, in May 1917, found that consumer prices had risen at a much higher
rate than import costs, and that such increases were completely unwarranted. Rates of
profit on flour, for example, had increased by more than 600 per cent, a revelation that
led the Advocate to heap scorn upon the nature of “the patriotism of the flour
dealer.”109 By July, even some of the more conservative members of the government
were willing to acknowledge the damaging effects of profiteering. John Crosbie
reported that the Salt Committee had found that some dealers were taking advantage
of the war to charge outport people excessive prices for salt and said that, in his
opinion, the situation was “not fair.”110 Following the recommendations of the HDLC,
the government established a Food Control Board in June 1917, which the FPU had
been demanding since early in the war.111 Shortly afterward, another long-standing
FPU demand was met when a new Department of Shipping was created and tasked
with finding ways of alleviating the tonnage problem through the regulation of
shipping.112
The National government
As the profiteering controversy intensified during the summer of 1917, a dramatic
change occurred in the political order. On 16 July, Morris announced the formation of
a National coalition government in which all parties would participate. Six Liberal-
Union MHAs, including Coaker, were invited to join the cabinet, along with six from
the People’s Party.113 Voluntary recruitment for the Newfoundland Regiment had
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come to a virtual standstill by 1917, and some of the more vocal elements of the local
elite were calling for the adoption of conscription – a measure that would require a
broad-based political consensus.114 While the new government was able to delay
addressing the conscription issue for a period of time, it did not hold back from
dealing with the question of wartime profits.
Producing-class groups had been demanding a tax on profits for some months. The
LSPU, for instance, demanded the “conscription of wealth” before the conscription of
manpower on the grounds that the producing classes had contributed more than their
share to the war effort already. When pro-conscription newspapers attacked the LSPU
for a supposed lack of patriotism, Jim McGrath retorted that the longshoremen were
more patriotic than profiteering capitalists.115 The Advocate said that the attitude of the
merchants was “sacrifice our sons, our brothers, our – no, not money.” Indeed, the
paper said “the only conscription of money is by those who have money. And the
money of the people is conscripted by those who take advantage of the war to exact
unjust profits.”116 Coaker said that there was overwhelming public support for taxing
wealth, since most people believed that “there are $3 million in the pockets of men on
Water Street that . . . should belong to the fishermen of the country.”117
With the creation of the new coalition government, even the more right-wing
ministers suddenly embraced the idea of conscripting wealth in the form of a business
profits tax. Finance Minister Cashin, who had earlier scoffed at accusations of
profiteering, now admitted that “since the war there has been more joy riding and other
amusements than ever before” on Water Street and that a tax on profits was
unavoidable.118 Cashin’s department initially proposed a non-retroactive flat rate tax of
25 percent on all profits above $2,000. According to the Advocate, the tax could not be
used to raise prices, since it was levied on profits rather than on businesses
themselves.119 There was some opposition to this from the business community, with the
Evening Telegram calling the proposed tax a “preposterous scheme” and accusing the
government of trying to sabotage the Newfoundland economy and force confederation
with Canada.120 Despite such grumbling, the tax bill went forward (although the rate was
reduced to 20 percent and the exemption increased to $3,000).121
Mercantile interests, meanwhile, were determined to use their domination of the
Legislative Council to block this new threat to their profit margin. While the tax bill
was passed unanimously by the House of Assembly, it was defeated on final reading
in the upper house by a vote of nine to seven. Most of those who voted against the bill
said they could accept some sort of tax, but deemed the proposed legislation “ill
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thought out” and unfair. According to Edgar Bowring, it smacked of “class
legislation.”122 Supporters of the tax were furious. Coaker warned that with the
Legislative Council’s opposition to the bill, “the old feeling of antagonism which has
lain dormant in the outports for the past 25 years has been aroused like a tiger.”123 The
Advocate accused members of the council of putting “personal interest above
patriotism,” but offered praise for those People’s Party members who had supported
the bill despite “their political sins of the past.”124
Governor Davidson agreed that opposition to the bill in the Legislative Council was
“actuated mainly by desire to escape taxation,” and was turning public opinion against
the council and, more importantly, against the war effort with which the ruling classes
were popularly associated. On Morris’s recommendation, Davidson appointed four
new members to the council, including Alex Mews, editor of the Advocate.125 With this
done, Morris again put the bill before the council. The nine members who had voted
against the measure the first time around refused to attend for the second vote, and the
tax bill was passed.126 The legislature also passed a bill restricting the powers of the
Legislative Council so that similar incidents would not occur in the future.127
With the coming of the new year, another unexpected change of government
occurred. On 1 January 1918, Morris tendered his resignation and Liberal leader
William Lloyd, a close ally of the FPU, took over as prime minister. This move
strengthened greatly the influence of the FPU within the government. Liberal-
Unionists held six posts in the new nine-member cabinet, and William Halfyard,
known as “Coaker’s closest lieutenant,” took over the influential position of colonial
secretary. The Advocate hailed the new government as a major victory for the
“producing classes” over “that bunch of high class gentry” on Water Street.128
The issue of profits came again to the fore with regard to the 1918 seal fishery, and
again the FPU and the merchants took opposing stands. This time, however, there was
no question as to which side the government was on. Coaker demanded that fishermen
be paid at least $12 per cwt. of seal oil, and he and Lloyd were able to persuade newly
appointed Governor Charles Harris to issue an order in council to that effect. This
brought an angry response from the merchants, who appealed immediately to Harris,
saying that this would force them to raise the export price if they were to make a
profit. Since the British government was the main purchaser of seal oil, the merchants
said that raising the export price would be “unpatriotic” and demanded that Harris
rescind the order. Harris, however, was unimpressed, saying that “the constitutional
rights of a Self-governing Colony would weigh more with His Majesty’s Government
than the danger of paying a higher price for seal oil.”129
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The Lloyd government also showed itself to be more amenable to the concerns of
workers than its predecessor when, in March 1918, employees of Reid Newfoundland
Company went out on strike under the leadership of the NIWA.130 While the
government officially maintained a neutral stance in the dispute, Lloyd worked behind
the scenes to bring the matter to an “amicable” conclusion. Cashin and Coaker also
put pressure on the company to give in to most of the workers’ demands.131 After three
weeks a settlement was reached in which most of the NIWA’s conditions were met,
including full recognition of the union’s right to represent workers.132 This victory
provided clear evidence of the success of the labouring classes in effecting change
through collective action, and of the growing power of the FPU, which favoured such
action, to exert its influence within the government.
The government’s cautious handling of the Reid strike stood in marked contrast to
the situation in Canada, where industrial relations ended up taking an entirely
different turn. The huge expansion of war industries in Canada provided full
employment, but rapidly rising prices led workers to demand higher wages; there was
significant growth in both union membership and in the number of strikes, particularly
among munitions workers and government employees. With the formation of the
Union coalition by Prime Minister Robert Borden in May 1917, it initially appeared
that there would be greater accommodation of the demands of labour. But promises
of a greater role for workers’ representatives in creating government policy were not
fulfilled. After a major wave of strikes in 1918, the Borden government resorted to
repressive measures (including the banning of radical labour organizations). In
September 1918, an order in council banned all strike activity for the duration of the
war. While this hardly put an end to labour unrest, which escalated dramatically after
the end of the war, it marked the start of a repressive climate that would extend into
the 1920s.133 No such repression of labour occurred in wartime Newfoundland.
Yet even as Lloyd’s National government showed willingness to support
Newfoundland’s labouring classes on economic issues, it was forced to act against the
will of many of its strongest supporters on the very contentious matter of military
conscription. A considerable segment of the producing classes, fishermen in
particular, were adamantly opposed to the adoption of compulsory service.134 In
January 1918, Coaker promised the rank and file of the FPU that the government
would not impose conscription unless such action was approved in a national
referendum.135 The massive German offensive launched on 21 March, however,
forced the government’s hand, as for the next few weeks the British Fifth Army
appeared to be nearing collapse on the Western Front. In April, Coaker abruptly
announced that, because of the deteriorating military situation, he had no choice but
to support conscription without referring the matter to the people. As well as the crisis
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in France, Coaker cited the need for Allied co-operation in alleviating the tonnage
problem as a reason for his sudden about-face.136
Coaker’s critics, most of whom had condemned his lack of patriotism when he had
opposed conscription, now accused him of having sold out the very fishermen he
represented. The Plaindealer, a St. John’s newspaper, launched a scathing attack on
the FPU leader aimed specifically at fishermen in Roman Catholic districts. Coaker
suddenly found that his own rhetoric was being turned against him. Conscription, said
The Plaindealer, was “the price we pay today for the corrupt bartering of the people’s
rights between the Reids, Morris and Coaker.” The latter was now part of the “hungry
horde of jackals . . . feasting upon the spoils of office” at the expense of fishermen and
workers.137 Coaker managed to weather the storm and, in the end, there was little overt
opposition to conscription from the Newfoundland people, most of whom
begrudgingly accepted its necessity. The aura of sainthood that Coaker had enjoyed
in the eyes of his followers was compromised, however, as he was perceived to have
sided, albeit under extreme duress, with the very people he had spent the previous
decade denouncing.138 The “great man” of the FPU had become just another
politician.
The Liberal-Unionists in the government, however, would not agree to demands
for conscription without some sort of quid pro quo to appease the labouring classes.
In return for acceding to demands for conscription of manpower, they offered the
people an increased effort to conscript wealth in the form of an income tax. Such a tax
had been one of the key demands of both the FPU and NIWA. Grimes, for instance,
had been calling for a progressive income tax, which he saw as the “only just system
of taxation.”139 In the House of Assembly Lloyd spoke of the need to obtain public
support for conscription, and insisted that this could only be done if the measure was
adopted in conjunction with an increased taxation of wealth. The new income tax, he
said, would conscript money from those wealthy individuals who were not subject to
the Business Profits Tax.140 Thus a tax long demanded by producing-class leaders, one
which would have been unobtainable a year earlier, came about in the context of the
growing pressures of the war effort.
Real as were the achievements of producing-class organizations and their political
allies, the collective power of the labouring classes was, by 1918, still more a potential
than an actual political force. The presence of Coaker and his allies in the coalition
government had given producers a greater voice in policy, but the capitalist class,
while subject to greater restraints on its actions, still dominated the political
landscape. The ability to use the issue of “patriotism” against the merchants,
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moreover, was lost with the end of hostilities, and so the scope for producers to
consolidate their wartime gains diminished rapidly. The onset of a severe economic
recession and the consequent increase in unemployment ended any hope of producers
being able to use economic leverage against capital.
On the political front, there were further setbacks. In 1919 the coalition between
the Liberal-Unionists and what remained of the People’s Party disintegrated, and the
older sectarian and parochial divisions soon replaced the class-based politics fuelled
by the war. The FPU was forced to find new allies in a political milieu that had
quickly become hopelessly fractious, and in which ideology was largely submerged
in a clash of personalities. An attempt by Coaker, as minister of fisheries in a new
“Liberal-Reform” government led by Sir Richard Squires, to impose state regulation
on the marketing of fish failed in the face of determined opposition from mercantile
and financial interests. Coaker’s involvement in the scandal-plagued Squires
administration, moreover, led to a growing alienation of the FPU from the St. John’s
working class. By the mid-1920s, the Newfoundland political environment was in
chaos, and the producing classes were in what was arguably a worse position than that
of 1914.141
Conclusions
The history of producing-class resistance in Newfoundland during the Great War
shows, first of all, that class-based resistance and organization could become more
prominent, and in Newfoundland’s case more successful, in times of extreme
economic and political pressure. Such pressure is rarely more intense than in wartime,
and the stresses placed upon Newfoundland society by the Great War gave producers
both additional incentive and an unprecedented opportunity to advance their
collective interests. While capitalists had extracted profits from the labour of
Newfoundlanders before the war, the increased surplus appropriation that resulted
from wartime profiteering brought about a greater awareness of existing economic
inequalities and fuelled class resentment to the point where organization became not
only desirable but essential. The war against Imperial Germany, justified through a
rhetoric of democracy and freedom, gave added legitimacy to the producing-class
movement, which was able to turn that rhetoric to its own advantage by arguing that
those causes were as relevant at home as they were in Europe. The fishermen and
workers of Newfoundland, and their representatives, were able to use the war effort
to their advantage in bringing about, at least for the remainder of the war, a change in
the political status quo.
A second noteworthy point was that the pressure of the war succeeded in bringing
together the two main segments of Newfoundland’s producing classes. Fishermen and
workers differed in their relationship to capitalism, and at times held divergent
opinions on political issues such as the desirability of import tariffs.142 But at least in
the context of wartime both groups managed to forge an alliance based on opposition
to a ruling elite that exploited all of them. Representatives of both producing groups
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stressed their shared identity as “toilers” and their shared experience of exploitation,
and proclaimed an affinity with each other rather than with any element or elements
of the capitalist classes. That membership in the FPU was open to labourers and
membership in the NIWA to fishermen itself demonstrated a clear recognition of this
affinity. The demands put forward by the two groups during the war were almost
identical, and were framed in the same language of resistance to what they saw as
“theft” of what rightly belonged to producers. While such opposition to a ruling class
could be found in other countries, in the case of Newfoundland the anti-merchant
sentiment that had long been embedded in the political culture gave an added force to
wartime complaints about profiteering and appears to have played a key role in
strengthening the producing-class alliance. Widespread public resentment of the
economic power of the Reids also factored heavily into the building of solidarity.
Finally, the case of Newfoundland in the Great War illustrates the difficulty of
bringing collective action by producers to permanent fruition. As noted above, the
post-war period saw a rapid erosion of the political influence of workers and
fishermen. While the defeat of collective working-class power in Newfoundland was
not as immediate or as stark as in Canada, where the 1918-1919 revolt of labour was
crushed by the state and often with much violence,143 it was just as complete. The
ultimate failure of the producing-class initiative was due in no small measure to its
having to operate within the existing structure of the Newfoundland state, which was
itself subordinated to the larger structure of the British Empire. Even a government
dedicated to bettering the lot of producers could not make fundamental alterations to
the economic status quo, nor could it effectively resist pressure to conscript manpower
for a war to which, for better or for worse, it was heavily committed. The actions of
the producing classes were constrained by the historical circumstances that they
confronted, and in the Newfoundland of 1918 the obstacles to radical social change
proved insurmountable. With the return of peacetime conditions came the gradual
deterioration of the collective working-class power for which the war had been the
key catalyst. Despite this lack of long-term success, however, the efforts of producers
to create a more equitable society constitute a significant element in the history of
20th-century Newfoundland. Just as Newfoundlanders rightly continue to
commemorate the sacrifices of those who fought on the battlefields of Europe,144 the
struggles of those who fought for social justice on the home front deserve
remembrance as well.
Producers versus Profiteers 69
143 See Gregory S. Kealey, “1919: The Canadian Labour Revolt,” Labour/Le Travail 13 (Spring 1984):
11-44.
144 For example, see Arlene King, “Beaumont Hamel: Our Place in the Somme,” Newfoundland
Quarterly 96, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 9-14.
00016-03 O'Brien Article_Layout  11-05-19  9:55 AM  Page 69
